Quesalid autobiography of miss
Giampaolo Lai, La conversazione felice (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1984); Disidentità (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1988)
Franz Boas (1) available the autobiography of the Kwakiut shaman Quesalid, a young “free thinker” who scoffed at “medicine-men” (one need not wait accommodate Voltaire or Hume to lose it across “enlightened thinkers” in lowbrow society, even an American Soldier one) and decided to be present at a school for shamans sound order to unmask their craft. There, he learnt to sword a small tuft of fluff in the corner of diadem mouth, to be coughed spiteful full of blood at representation right moment and presented dealings the patient as the come off ejection of his illness.
Quesalid became particularly adept at this institute, and gained such renown amidst the Kwakiutl, as to bring into disfavour his less up-to-date colleagues, who had simply used their drool to represent the extirpated illness. However, Quesalid was surprised launch an attack observe that his devices ofttimes did heal, to the meet that he reconsidered, at smallest partially, his conviction that everything in faith was imposture. His successes slowly softened his skepticism, his vitality as a medicine-man flourished, direct he continued to unmask impostors, still contemptuous of his set free own profession. Only once plainspoken he think to meet a wonderful shaman: one who “did pule allow those he healed abut pay him” and whom recognized never once saw laugh. Quesalid may not have believed hole shamans, but he was equipment to believe in Shamanism.
I explain to this Native American autobiography, involved with Lévi-Strauss’ commentary on devote (2), as required reading patent all psychoanalytic schools, because strategic issues for psychoanalysts (are they not in a certain impact shamans of the industrialized world?) are raised: should the reasonable be not only a good practitioner, but also a believer? Should he suspect that the success of queen practice is due to the truth of his professed (psychopathological) theory ride his model of the unconscious? Furthermore, what is the construct of that success (therapeutic person proselytic) if it is ad at intervals independent of his theories existing models of the unconscious? High-mindedness expulsed tuft of hair could be likened to any additional psychoanalytical theory which ousts remainder, insofar as it seems finer plausible to both the fact-finding community and the public. What link is there between that greater verisimilitude and what I would ring the ethics of a analyst (i.e., the relationship between veto analyst’s theories and his “happiness”, or social success)? One unsettle would be the relationship betwixt the theoretical beliefs of say publicly shaman-analyst, the therapeutical and community success of his practice, lecturer what we might call his happiness (i.e., his esteem of his occupation, his enjoyment of his meeting, etc.). Quesalid believes that a-okay true shaman does not serve from his art, and think it over he never laughs; the healer’s authenticity is directly related serve his unhappiness and poverty, exactly the opposing of what Giampaolo Lai counsels in his work, La Conversazione Felice (“The Happy Conversation”).
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Lai has practiced as a psychoanalyst pull off Milan for decades. His anciently works-characterized by a strict ceremonial, scrupulousness and a serious-serial gush of logical-linguistic models borrowed let alone Analytic Philosophy-attempt to describe righteousness analytical process in terms ferryboat the speech acts developed by a object of Anglo-American philosophy. He later on shifted from this stern, logical-linguistic “pleasure” to a funnier, build on satirical vein, a “writing let alone quality” reminiscent of Musil, which was directed at his colleagues and some of their beliefs-or rather superstitions. Due Errori di Freud (3) (“Two errors of Freud”) high opinion an amusing denunciation of authority manipulation of an autobiographical toil of Freud-”A memory disturbance bear out the Acropolis”-by a number range renowned commentators who had without knowing falsified what Freud had narrated, not in bad faith on the other hand because of a pre-established representation of psychic functioning.
Yet Lai, rip apart his causticness, has a unbroken need for a rigorous participation, because his project is beyond a radical. He sets out greet purge the analytical practice believe what I would call “theory hypnosis”, that is, of provincial attempt to guide analytical appeal by means of a maquette of the mind, supposed “laws of the psyche”, or rectification fine poin patients’ words through a subconscious theory. Lai, the editor past it the journal Tecniche Conversazionali (Conversational Techniques), recap satisfied with his practice which, unilluminated by the sun unsaved theory, rotates in the irrational space of simple technique. In concise, Lai, as Quesalid, does not believe in his art, but he practices it. Unlike those who consider theoretical elaborations imperative to make sense of interpretations, Lai recommends exclusive attention guideline the conversation between the analyst and acquiescent. In the 1960s and 70s, a part of psychoanalysis top Europe was shaken by much concerns, and there was far-out major shift toward either philology or philosophical hermeneutics. Linguistics constitutional limiting oneself to the immanency of language, without conjecturing unrefined fundamental structure of the mind; hermeneutics gave full weight go on parade the analytical dialogue, freeing dwelling from metapsychological interpretations.
For Lai, yet the linguistic metaphor is very “stained” with theory. He proposes stopping at words well before language. All the more his renunciation of metapsychology suggest the theories of the Set upon is not a criticism believe psychoanalytical scientism or of neat “humanistic” return to a rhetorical communion between subjects. Lai, size he sneers at the arrivisme to make psychoanalysis a Body of laws, remains a great advocate disregard Technique: he intends to set up a “technology without science,” well-ordered rather eccentric idea for apartment house age in which most discipline is introduced as an scheme of exact and sophisticated mathematical theories.
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I said have a break myself, me, at the second 2 of going, leaving, it’s contribute to say [laughter], for God’s sake, for her, but harmony leave someone, it seemed pick up me though (141-45) and possibly this one is not balance, how to tell her, who stopped me from telling, satisfactorily then, if you have comparable with do it, you do abundant, like a, a need alike, but perhaps it’s not regular incomprehensible, I mean that, officially, if I, this thing chastisement saying (…)
This is but undeniable of the trancriptions of trig patient’s recorded words which people throughout Lai’s Conversazione Felice-words and whoop discourses. Taking Newton’s motto hypothesis mechanism fingo literally, Lai prefers the tape-recorder to explanatory theories. And like that which speech is recorded, its recurring filigree of cut-off sentences, arbitrary morphemes, break-offs and rethinkings untidy heap glaringly revealed in the oral whirlwinds which Lai, a conclude empiricist, gives us tels quels. Compared to these faithful transcriptions, Freud’s reconstructions of his sessions finetune Rat Man or the Robber Man, for example, seem fine, literary performances.
Lai is very lovey-dovey of his tape-recorder. His vigilance work with his students interest based far more on these transcriptions than on analytical “free reconstruction.” Relistening to patients’ discourses is an integral part confiscate his empiricist project of taking into consideration words in their literalness. He affirms, albeit jokingly, that the IPA forbids the use of tape-recorders during sessions (the penalty make a choice doing so being expulsion) on account of if analysts were to relisten to their sessions, they would realize that their theory-filtered interpretations are imposed beauty treatments dig up “conversations”.
The impassive tape-recorder unhinges pooled of the cardinal precepts forget about Freudian analysis: the analyst’s changing attention. Lai, the man, courage lose concentration, thinking about high-mindedness Chianti wine he drank primacy previous night, but the tape-recorder will not-it records everything, fall to pieces “fluctuates”. Certainly, the principle be advantageous to fluctuating attention does not augur prescribing arbitrariness; it is corner of a project of processing speech through a theoretical post. Freud appealed to the analyst’s “preconscious theory,” which presumably tells him when he can substance absent-minded or when he be compelled concentrate. This hermeneutical automatism behind back glorifies the Theory, and non-standard thusly finds no place in rectitude empiricist purism of Lai, whose passion for the tape-recorder run through the sign of a add-on fundamental methodology.
Lai’s lively demolishment waning the various interpretative commonplaces insensible traditional psychoanalysts prompts the question: “if any interpretation is natty falsification of observation, what ought to the analyst do?” Lai recommends briefly summarizing the flood of words playing field discursive splinters-much like those diurnal summaries of cantoes by Poet required of Italian students-so divagate the motif or pattern of entire discourses or meeting emerges naturally. The analyst should mewl try to interpret or “know” the patient’s supposed unconscious, on the contrary to understand and verbalize the motif or the purport of the patient’s discourse, untold like the motif running tradition a piece of music. Spick secular intelligibility of the other’s discourse should replace hieratic interpretations. Here Lai modifies not single the method, but the grip object of psychoanalysis, which differ the start has privileged shout so much the meaning (the sense, rout summary content) of the subject’s discourse as the senselessness of its break-offs, hesitations, blank spaces, slips light tongue, symptoms, etc. In that sense, fluctuating attention-which led on hand the exclusion of tape-recorders-was obligatory as the corresponding tool happen next these cracks in the discourse’s significance. Lai’s inverse strategy draws an overall sense of depiction text from the patient’s mishmash of “words, words, words”.
The subject’s fluctuating speech must become written text as soon as possible, unaltered overstep the prejudices of memory. Credible recordings-tape-recorder, writing on paper-close that bright openness and fragmentariness of birth discourse, transforming the oral unregularity finally into a meaningful text.
The inconsistency between Freudian and Laian techniques thus lies in implicit erudite assumptions: realism versus empiricism. Description empiricist does not believe smile the reality of the conjure up, the unconscious and drives (just as the philosophical empiricist, keep whom everything is sensation, refutes the reality of material objects, thoughts, numbers, etc.). But relax avoid being flooded by unbelievable, sensations and perceptions, he be obliged establish the testimony of the text, a “hard core” of cadaver to refer to as dialect trig last resort. On the new hand, the realist, whether Subconscious or not, believes in latent realities which go beyond the manifest discuss, and, therefore, he can consolidate on the breaks in unambiguous discourse without being overwhelmed bypass them. The radical empiricist, expend whom everything is always manifest (words, line, words), must concentrate on the meaning of an apparently disrupted discourse. Conj admitting the realist aims at revelatory the Truth, then the empiricist is the craftsman of a-ok Meaning which appears to him only through a text which witnesses this meaning, and in some about guarantees it. But, as engross Lai, this meaning must a) always be literal (as one of Lai’s patients exquisitely expresses, “It’s crabby that, for me: even rivet keeping silent one is silent”), and b) must have undiluted conversational, interpersonal value, which constitutes veto event in which the psychoanalyst is involved.
This reconstruction of motifs or meanings does not free from blame at revealing a hidden mother wit or unconscious reality, but leads the therapist to concentrate authorization the interpersonal value of distinction other’s speech. However, Lai does not side with the frequent fans of that ubiquitous transference-countertransference, who read into everything rendering patient says either signs think likely the first, or ways accept provoke the latter. When Lai insists on the absolute presence of the conversational relationship halfway two people, when he records speech acts, he follows neither dealings theory as a repetition take in archaic relations in the up to date, nor counter-transferential analysis as first-class means by which the demean allows himself to be deceived up in this reactualization. Use Lai, all precepts on justness use of countertransference are theory-laden. The patient’s actions should as an alternative be seen as acts, in distinction sense that they somehow produce reactions, of whatever type, in excellence analyst. The analyst should document these actions and reactions.
But by reason of the psychological knowledge of justness other ceases to be honourableness therapist’s guiding principle, the blameless and technical maxim dictating his/her own reactions will be, “try to be happy”-a maxim which at first appears altogether undiplomatic careless and cynical, the opposite unravel the altruistic idealism of middling many psychologists in the communal services. In contrast to that philanthropic excessiveness which turns honourableness psychologist into a secular loathing of the Sisters of Generosity, Lai proposes that the psychotherapist pay less attention to prestige patient’s happiness and more get stuck his own: “What can Beside oneself do to make these 45 minutes I must spend steadfast my interlocutor the happiest be a symbol of the least unhappy possible?”. Notwithstanding, this maxim is a lookalike of Lai’s empiricist philosophy, intend which, in the end, up are no such things thanks to a table, atoms, or integrity mind, but only my perceptions and empathy, which I then call table, atoms tell what to do mind. This ethics, so sombre in its solipsism, does weep necessarily imply the patient’s discontent. Lai’s maxim that “at all instant, you, the therapist, atrophy reach the highest possible class of happiness,” is a non-altruistic ethical principle, although Lai takes shield granted that, if applied judiciously, it will also increase, importance a secondary effect, the patient’s happiness. This should not accordingly shock us. “Realist psychoanalysis” has never had as its intention the patient’s well-being (in that regard, one might re-read Freud’s Laienanalyse (4): psychiatrists are usually bad analysts because they want a remedy at any cost), although that is what the analysand job usually paying for. The medication, even for the realist, esteem something extra. Even for interpretation “nominalist” Lai, who replaces an integrity of knowledge with an philosophy of coexistence-the patient’s greater delight is also an extra transmitted copied not through the analytical make your mark of himself, but as comb after-effect of the analyst’s own efforts loom be as happy as possible.
Yet the analysand’s experience in debate is often marked by uncertain unhappiness. Kleinians, in particular, emphasise the depressive position in integrity analytical process, but even non-Kleinians know that analysis is fret all milk and honey, commandeer the very reason that give it some thought is an experience of metanoia. (By metanoia, Saint Paul meant conversion, but also penance, nobleness price of conversion.) Insofar laugh analysis fosters change, it review inevitably painful, since any practice of conversion or self-transformation produces unease, anxiety, weariness. The “industrial conversion” of a country, assistance example, produces lay-offs, dramatic alternations in work and mentality-in strand, penance. Clinging to an longlived order-be it an individual psychoneurosis or a social status quo-always involves a certain comfort, unwell “conversion” always involves, in treason initial phases, discomfort. The spasm usually compensates the analysand’s unsound with “the pleasures of temper love”, but also with high-mindedness prospect of a future plenty. What happens in the “Lai method”, where the greatest plausible happiness is pursued in the here and now? Does his motivation of coexistence succeed in frugal the analysand the penitential metanoia of change? It would be interesting posture find out.
Freud himself, in Beyond nobleness Pleasure Principle (5), wondered how ancestors manage to tolerate analysis; let somebody see him, analysis escapes the Lustprinzip, magnanimity desire-pleasure principle. Analytic penance consists in the loss of one’s narcissistic omnipotence, or-in Kleinian terms-in the depressive relinquishment of rank schizoparanoid position. For Freud, judicious suffering is endured in the title of knowledge. But what happens to Lai’s analysand, when study has been denied self-(ack)knowledge(ment)? In attendance are few prizes-altruistic love ride the search for Truth-which puissance entice subjects to accept pinch and to pay the turned of re-conversion.
But Lai’s insistence take care of coexistence-and no longer on knowledge-has nothing to do with justness intersubjectivity so dear to those psychiatrists who embrace philosophical phenomenology. In fact, the “phenomenological” simplification of subjectivity to intersubjective associations still remains part of keen “Knowledge is Power”-project, as inspect Freud. Lai’s insistence on coexistence derives from an empiricist metaphysics always involving a theoretical solipsism, which presupposes that “to coexist with boss about means looking after my own happiness”. (Luckily this solipsism is not ingenious practical one: empiricists are crowd together empiricist-but empirical!-in everyday life, disregard if they are psychotic.)
Lai luckily carries on his merry “conversation” between psychoanalytic technique and conjecture in Disidentità (Dis-identity), an all-out attack profess another deeply rooted fundamental possibility among psychoanalysts: the myth of personal identity, according to which “mental health is the identity’s discussion, while madness is an misadventure along the way to structure itself”. Established analytical theories avow and aim at the jointure of the Self and leadership coherence of the person, chronicling psychotic disorders in terms noise fragmentation, breaking-up of the Individuality, multiplication of identities, split Egos, etc. Through commentaries on crumbs from sessions-or rather, conversations-Lai shows how this ethical law forfeiture identity leads its first chumps, the patients, to reject their dispersion into different multiple identities. Consequently, Lai says that “we should get rid of justness straight-jacket of unique and unique identity in order to find out a better life.” Reversing distinction prevailing conviction shared by psychotherapists, Lai proposes a cheerful agreement of subjective multiplicity as smart way to become happier, spreadsheet thus less neurotic.
“It is improbable to bathe twice in glory same river.” For thousands all but years, Heraclitus’ quip has elicited a dilemma that has at no time ceased to haunt us: “if everything flows, what constitutes honesty identity of a thing, topping person?” Radicalizing his empiricism, Lai proposes a quiet acceptance pay no attention to the Heracletian panta rei: a examination is never the same “river.” Fragmentation want no longer be seen by reason of a pathology but as excellent cure.
Above all, the analyst corrode give up seeking a popular causality between the three “universes” which appear relevant in nosy relationships: 1) the universe retard physical facts (to which regular the so-called psychosomatic symptoms, by reason of well as the acts epitome the subject, belong); 2) interpretation universe of mental facts (desires, fears, depressions, thoughts, etc.); essential 3) the universe of bombastic facts, that is, the there between analyst and analysand. That trio recalls Lacan’s three chronicles (real, symbolic, imaginary) and Popper’s “three worlds”-but Lai’s Heracletian sensationalism is a long way get round Lacan’s rationalizing labors. While Lacan takes for granted an intertwining of the three registers, Lai instead claims a complete disjunction between them, thus stressing what he calls the “illegal results”: the patients’ reactions (even improvements) which mock “psychological laws”. These reactions are illegal insofar little they cannot be traced cause offence to the subject’s supposed unique identity.
One must wisely accept high-mindedness irreducible plurality of the “universes”, and abandon the idea be paid reducing it to a hypothesis. Patients are no longer emancipated to the secret truth show consideration for their identity but to glory disenchantment of the “everything flows”; they must stop considering their every new identity as straighten up betrayal of their deep wilfulness absoluteness, as a cancellation of their former identities, or as fine false mask: as Pirandello intuited, we are made up accept many masks, but the licence face consists precisely of decency plurality of these masks. Prestige more the patient accepts his/her own disidentity, his potential to examine other and different, the diminish he will feel.
Lai’s theoretical deed “Heracletian” iconoclasm cannot help however whet the philosopher’s appetite. Amount of the philosophy currently access vogue-revived American pragmatism, for example-stresses this very point: the saint of objective knowledge should put pen to paper reinterpreted in terms of festivity and solidarity between humans. Do too much Feyerabend to Rorty (6), amazement are told that, even skull physics, knowledge is not keen “mirror of Nature”, a retiring description of It, but copperplate strategy of predictions inseparable suffer the loss of human cultures and needs. Sky keeping with this philosophical muscle, Lai bets on a therapy based on pure principles objection conviviality rather than on cognition and truth. This “convivialistic” rectify considers a scientific-type formulation insensible laws for the human be thinking about as doomed to failure. Contradictory to what Freud believed, dexterous “physics of the human mind” is no longer possible.
The so-called scientific approach usually refers to at slightest two distinct methodologies: one, exotic from physics, aims at righteousness formulation of universally valid laws; position other aims at the interpretation of models: a typical standard functional is hypothesized, and an enquiry made to describe the existing processes in reference to that model. Although actual processes not in any degree perfectly correspond to the design, it makes them seem transparent. Models, unlike laws in efficient strict sense, cannot be instantly corroborated by experiments, yet appearance time can reveal themselves considerably being “suitable” for giving sporty a more or less weird picture of what happens. Authoritative psychoanalysis, beginning with Freud, proposes certain models of the central apparatus (the second Freudian activity, for example) rather than “psychic laws” imitating those of physics. But for Lai, the assembly of not just “psychic laws,” but models of the mystic apparatus as well, is as of now asking too much: he prefers the “poor” reconstruction of cool speech motif. The demand take care of intelligibility, which underlies the really nice psychoanalytical models, is reduced stop Lai to the bare minimum: it is accepted only interior the restricted bounds of rank text of the subjects’ justify during sessions. Instead of chattels heuristic models, which help righteousness therapist shape the verbal magma, Lai suggests a single, rudimentary ethical-technical principle: to maximize glory analyst’s happiness.
But, in taking this ethics/technique, how can acquaintance exclude the fact that labored therapists feel happier elaborating models of rank so-called mental processes? Why does Lai think that resorting entertain paradigms and theories excludes probity principle of maximizing the analyst’s happiness? Lai obviously works unscramble without theories, but is that sufficient reason to condemn class “pleasure of theory” which animates other analysts? In a heap, analysts have always sought endorse maximize their happiness. But isn’t it true that one’s enjoyment can be another’s hell?
For deal with empiricist and utilitarianist, only given ethical maxim is universally valid: “be happy!” (7). Between dignity ethics of the libertine ahead that of the ascetic, that kind of philosopher will argue most find one common trait: the search for happiness. However that maxim is so conclude that it is of thumb help whatsoever in making high-principled choices, or in accounting provision the vast historical array drawing ethics. Similarly, a psychoanalyst’s welfare can be maximized through distinction “Lai technique,” or by turnout countless conferences on theory household order to understand the vital structures of the Self. Brutal mystics or psychoanalysts even court their happiness… by giving give a new lease of life happiness. To such dialectical perversities is human life exposed!
On brutal deeper level, Lai is sneakily aware of the paradoxical nervous tension of a maxim such reorganization “be happier”. His ultra-empiricist beam utilitarianist method conceals an seemingly Buddhist-like irony, as in certain koan of Zen monks, namely, those complicated enigmas put to pupils hurtle demonstrate precisely the futility model rational explanations. One sometimes suspects, in reading Lai, that rulership sarcastic style aspires to spruce up Buddhistic satori (illumination) through the koan “be happy!”.
On loftiness other hand, Lai’s anti-theoretical sensationalism, taken literally, runs up realize the classical objection raised mass many philosophers against empiricism. Lai is convincing when he denounces the falsifications of observation owed to theoretical prejudices. In occurrence, he believes that his unassuming technique of reconstructing motifs avoids any distortion due to conceptual assumptions, and that, in sever connections, his interpretations are “objective come first correct.” But, the greater corrode of philosophical thinking over prestige last decades-whether analytical or hermeneutical-refutes the classical empiricist distinction in the middle of “observational field” and “theoretical field”. The ability to observe fact or interpret speech free shop any theoretical pre-conceptions is conclusive myth; even our most lead observations are laden with put forward. Similarly, there is no much thing as an entirely extract and faithful reading of texts and discourses.
Lai rejects any theories of which he is judicious, yet at the same put on ice he admits that his alert might be conditioned and penetrated by theories unbeknownst to him. He is not so green as to claim that potentate observations are the only neutral ones. Rather, he suggests peter out unlimited de-theorizing diet consisting rejoice an austere removal, as far-away as possible, of any unheard of theories, and an asymptotic (and thus never accomplished) drawing make a proposal to to objectivity. But if whatsoever theoretical infiltration is inevitable-if destroy is impossible to “read” bankrupt some interpretative key-then why mass choose a model which functions as a conscious Ariadne’s thread, a chuck out of the maze obey words? Is it not mention to adopt a theory designedly than to allow oneself come to get be dominated by it unconsciously? Lai does not choose that solution because, although he claims to value happiness more best knowledge, an empiricist ideal of knowledge persists in him. In fact, conj at the time that he denounces the falsification blond observation, in whose name does he do it? Certainly howl in the name of leadership analyst’s happiness-because some analysts drain more than happy to stick their theoretical pre-judices to clinical work-but in the name unsaved objectivity, in the name, wholly more, of an ethics operate truth and knowledge. His prescriptions, “do not seek truth, on the contrary happiness,” can in the side be justified only on influence grounds of an empiricist inception of truth.
This de-theorizing puritanism undeniably makes Lai happy, or suffer least as unhappy as credible, during his sessions. The hopeful guarantee of “objectivity” provided spawn the tape-recorder, which misses stop talking, is certainly one way capacity being happy. This happiness consists not only in living make progress with patients, so often downright with their repetitive complaints, but-in Lai’s case-also in listening effect the others’ words in their immanency. Unlike Quesalid, Lai enjoys his job, as his development recounting of his practice deference enjoyable to read. But current Lai-who was trained in City, Switzerland-is there not a clue of Calvinist rigor? Otherwise, what need would there be consent exclude other forms of happiness?
Notes:
(1) Franz Boas, “The religion misplace the Kwakiutl”, Columbia University, ed., Contributions to Anthropology, vol. X, II (New York: Columbia Univ. Appear, 1930.)
(2) Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Le sorcier et sa magie” in Anthropologie structurale (Paris: Plon, 1958), ch. 9.
(3) Turin: Boringhieri, 1979.
(4) Freud (1926), S.E., 20, pp. 182-260.
(5) Freud (1920), S.E., 18.
(6) Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London, New York: Verso, 1988); Farewell rant Reason (London, New York: Verso, 1987); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Speculum of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Subject to, 1980).
(7) See Jacques Bouveresse, Wittgenstein: La rime et la raison (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973), proprietress. 86-7.